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Article 5

Comment

The Hazards to the Press of Claiming
a "Preferred Position"
By WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE*
Three persons stand before the gate of San Quentin prison.
One is an investigative reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle.
One is the chairperson of "The Prisoners' Rights Committee" of the
Socialist Workers Party. One is a concerned person privately interested in satisfying himself (herself) about the condition of San
Quentin; a person who might (or might not) be moved thereafter
to write something about his experience and who might (or might
not) have sufficient literary skills to find an outlet for his manuscript. All are turned away on the basis of a uniform prison policy
not permitting entry to any person in the absence of special business, e.g., an attorney is permitted access, but access itself is limited
to consultation with an individual prisoner. Each subsequently engages legal counsel to file suit to enjoin the warden of San Quentin
from enforcing the prison rule. The basis of each suit is the first
amendment provision that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press . .. .
Three persons stand before the closed doors of the City of San
Francisco Board of Education chamber. They are the same three
as earlier appeared outside San Quentin. The Board is meeting in
"executive session," to review the current pupil assignment policy
in effect during the preceding year and to determine what modification, if any, should now be made. All three are turned away,
and each soon thereafter files suit to enjoin the Board from enforcing its rule under which executive sessions may be scheduled upon
majority vote of the School Board members. The basis of each
suit is the fourteenth amendment due process clause which makes
applicable to the states the first amendment provision already
quoted.
In response to the six cases filed under these two sets of circum-

stances, the Supreme Court of the United States decides favorably to
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one plaintiff and adversely to the other two. The claims of the San
Francisco investigative reporter succeed. The claims of the Socialist
Workers Party Committee person and of the unattached individual fail.
With respect to all of the cases, the Court unanimously acknowledges
that there is a substantial first amendment interest. Only with respect
to the reporter, however, does the Court conclude that there is a sufficient first amendment entitlement to invalidate the prison and school
board policies which (1) only indirectly affect "the freedom of speech
or of the press" and (2) are substantially related to valid public purposes.
On the first point, the Court began by noting that nothing on the
face of the first amendment expressly establishes any right of access
to particular places or to particular sources of information. What the
amendment forbids is governmental restriction on the freedom of
persons to speak and to publish whatever is on their minds-without
regard to the good sense or accuracy of what they choose to say.
Nevertheless, the Court conceded that insofar as government itself
cordoned off various sources of information, the social utility of free
speech was impaired and first amendment values were implicated. It
noted that it had previously applied such a first amendment value in
invalidating government restrictions on the receipt of mail originating
in certain communist countries, and that it had adverted to the same
principle in invalidating a refusal by the State Department to issue a
passport to an American communist.' In each instance, the foreclosure
of access to sources of information was considered too severe a curtailment on the individual's capacity adequately to inform himself on
matters which might give meaning to his freedom of speech as the
principal constitutional check on government power.
The Court also noted, however, that discrete and limited government restrictions on sources of information were not themselves forbidden by the Constitution2 and, indeed, that some such restrictions
were very well recognized. Congress was at liberty to meet in executive session consistent with its own rules, for instance, and the Court
had also acknowledged a limited power of executive privilege.' For
that matter, weekly conferences of the Supreme Court itself were
wholly secret. No one is admitted to the conferences of the Court in
which pending cases are discussed by the justices. Concluding that
equivalent reasons (to induce candor and to avoid premature release
1. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
2. See Keindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
1 (1965).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (dictum); United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952).
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of sensitive material) were adequate to explain some school board discretion to meet in executive session, and that substantial reasons (of
security, the avoidance of administrative hardship, and of maintaining
a uniform atmosphere conducive to sound penological objectives) also
explained the felt necessity of forbidding the public general access to
prisons, the Court concluded that the general first amendment
claims
4
were, on balance, not sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to relief.
In respect to the investigative reporter of the San Francisco
Chronicle, however, the decision of the Court was that, as applied to
him, both restrictions were invalid. Starting with the observation that
the first amendment itself appeared to recognize a distinct and separate
constitutional position of the press ("Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press"), plaintiff's counsel
emphasized the institutional role of the press in systematically disseminating to the public at large such news and information as it was able
reliably to assemble-a disseminating function not assumed by either
of the other two parties who had sought access.5 Indeed, counsel
urged, the press not only thus contributed to the fund of public information in unique ways, unlike an unattached private citizen or a functionary of a political party, the press served as an agency of the public;
that is, as a means of securing the public right to know, an agency made
all the more vital insofar as no other means would be available to alert
the public to the manner in which the government presumed to conduct
the public business.
Responding sympathetically to this analysis, the Court unanimously held in favor of the reporter's claim, declaring in the course
of its opinion:
In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the
public at large. It is the means by which the people receive that
free flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent self-government. By enabling the public to assert meaningful control
over the political process, the press performs a crucial function in
effecting the societal purpose of the First Amendment.
In dealing with the free press guarantee, it is important to note that
the interest it protects is not possessed by the media themselves.
. . . The Press has a preferred position in our constitutional
scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart
as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public's right to
know.
4. Cf. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Fell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817 (1974).
5. Cf. Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What
Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.i. 639, 652 (1975); Stewart,
"Or of the Press," 26 HAsTrNGs L.J 631 (1975). But see Lange, The Speech and
Press Clauses,23 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 77, 100-07 (1975).
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Shortly after the conclusion of these cases in the Supreme Court, the
investigative reporter of the San Francisco Chronicle spent a number
of hours visiting within San Quentin and sitting in during executive
sessions of the San Francisco Board of Education, subsequently filing
lengthy stories, which, with minor editing, were promptly and fully published in the Chronicle.
Within one month of the Chronicle's series on San Quentin, two
law suits were filed against the Chronicle and a bill was introduced in
Congress, all in response to the content of "The San Quentin Story."
The fist of the law suits was brought by the warden of San Quentin
in federal district court to compel the Chronicle promptly to publish
a reply the warden had prepared in response to the Chronicle series
-a reply he had already submitted to the Chronicle but which the
Chronicle had refused to run. Claiming that the published series was
substantially inaccurate and misleading in its description of conditions
within San Quentin, the warden pressed the point vigorously that the
public was entitled to know the whole truth and that, as fiduciary of
the public interest, the Chronicle was duty bound to present both sides
of a given controversy to provide a necessary diversity of information
and opinion without which the public could be misled. Conceding that
ordinarily the first amendment could not be used to compel a person
or a voluntary association to lend its own forum or publication to the
dissemination of dissent, the warden pressed upon the district court the
very distinctions which the Chronicle had itself so successfully used in
its special pleading for extraordinary first amendment access rights.
The press, he observed, was granted that special access on the strength
of an interest "not possessed by the media themselves," but "to bring
fulfillment to the public's right to know." In basing its claims on that
ground, the press was now estopped from acting in a manner frankly
inconsistent with that position, i.e., by asserting that the press was as
free as anyone else to determine the content of its published pages.
Those pages belonged to the public, and so long as the materials submitted for publication were neither repetitious of what may already
have been published there nor irrelevant to a subject which the
Chronicle had been able to examine wholly on account of its special
claim as a public agency, it was without authority to deny or to censor
the publication of a reply which would have at least as much likelihood
of ascertaining the truth about conditions at San Quentin as the
Chronicle'sown report.
The federal district court was well aware of the case of Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo--but was persuaded that that case
6. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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was readily distinguishable. In the Miami Herald case, a "right of
reply" statute had been held invalid as applied to a newspaper editorial
not based on information which the newspaper had acquired solely by
force of special access as an agent or representative of the public
interest. Rather, the editorial in the Miami Herald had been prepared
solely on the basis of information as readily availableto anyone else
as it had been available to the newspaper.
As the story in the Chronicle was based on special access claims
made possible only because the Chonicle relied upon the public interest
(and related itself to that interest simply as an agent), the federal district
court concluded that the controlling decision was not the Miami Herald
case but rather the case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 7 There,
in sustaining substantive regulations by the FCC requiring each broadcaster to serve "the public interest, convenience, and necessity" by providing for a full right of reply by any identifiable person disparaged
in the course of a broadcast, the Supreme Court had unanimously concluded:
Nor can we say that it is inconsistent with the First Amendment
goal of producing an informed public capable of conducting its own
affairs to require a broadcaster to permit answers to personal attacks occurring in the course of discussing controversial issues
8

In the Red Lion case, the Supreme Court had noted that broadcasters
could be subjected to special duties which could not constitutionally be
imposed upon others because the broadcaster enjoyed a special privilege not similarly shared by others, that is, exclusive use of a given
wavelength in a given market. In Warden of San Quentin v. San
Francisco Chronicle, the newspaper was identically subjected to an
identical restraint based on identical reasoning, i.e., exclusive access to
a given source of information not available to others. The Chronicle
appealed the decision of the federal district court-but the decision was
affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion reciting simply that the district
court opinion was clearly correct.
Within the same week as the warden's suit against the Chronicle,
a second suit was brought against the newspaper, arising from the same
story. This action was for libel, brought by a trusty of the prison,
alleging that the description of his conduct at San Quentin as trusty
was false and damaging. In preparing to defend against this action,
the Chronicle very carefully reviewed those parts of its published story
adverting to the trusty, and discovered two things: (1) The investigative reporter had used reasonable care in relying upon his sources
7. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
8. Id. at 392.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

and certainly did not knowingly use any false statements, although for
reasons not reasonably discoverable by the reporter, a few of the state-

ments about the trusty were in fact false; (2) The principal source for
this part of the story was provided by seemingly reliable, firsthand

statements of two different prisoners plus another trusty of San
Quentin, all of whom the reporter had interviewed under a commit-

ment of confidentiality in the course of his on-site newsgathering within
San Quentin.
Based on its review, the Chronicle answered the complaint in the
libel action by admitting the possibility of some factual error but by
citing the Supreme Court decisions in New York Times v. Sullivan9 and
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.'0 as a first amendment defense. Thus,

the Chronicle argued that even assuming the plaintiff were a "private"
rather than a "public" figure," still the first amendment barred an
action for libel unless false (and presumptively damaging) statements
about an identifiable person were made negligently. 12 The first amendment would surely not permit strict liability.
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
11. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). But see Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
12. An understanding of the California statutory scheme is helpful in evaluating
the argument that the first amendment will not allow the imposition of liability without
fault. In California, libel is defined as "a false and unprivileged publication by writing,
printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any
person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned
or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation."
CAL. Civ.
CODE § 45 (West 1954) (emphasis added).
This section has been interpreted to allow
the recovery of compensatory damages even where the absence of malice is proved.
See Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 P. 530 (1911).
Under California law, the Chronicle might also raise the stautory defense that
its publication of the article was privileged under section 47(3) of the Civil Code.
and thus not actionable in the absence of malice. That section provides that a communication "without malice, to a person interested therein . . . by one who stands in
such relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing
the motive for the communication innocent," is privileged. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3)
(West 1954). This provision has been applied primarily to individual relationships
such as communications between members of a church relating to church matters. See
Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948). See also
Moore v. Greene, 431 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1970) (letter from former attorney to newly
chosen attorney relating to mutual client); Shoemaker v. Friedberg, 80 Cal. App. 2d
911, 183 P.2d 318 (1947) (medical communications between a patient and his physician); Longsworth v. Curson, 56 Cal. App. 489, 206 P. 779 (1922) (communications
between employees and their employer regarding a co-employee). It has also beep
applied in dicta, however, to a magazine article about a policy of a Laguna Beach
school board which allegedly libeled the board president. See Harris v. Curtis Publishing Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 340, 121 P.2d 761 (1942).
In finding that publication
of the article was a communication between interested parties the court noted "that
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Legal counsel representing the plaintiff trusty argued that neither
New York Times nor Gertz was applicable to this case. The reason
was that in neither case did the offending publication purport to represent the public's right to know as an agent or fiduciary of the public.
In neither case had the press held itself out as possessing special
entitlements to news sources unavailable to others but available
exceptionally to itself. The plaintiff's position was that insofar as the
public was invited to rely upon the Chronicle more than upon the utterances of others, a higher standard of care should be imposed upon
the newspaper as a public fiduciary. Similarly, he argued, a fiduciary
is subject to a greater measure of accountability in fulfilling its duty
to the public right to know. Thus, the plaintiff was entitled to have
the court subpoena the reporter and to demand of him the names of
those whose statements he had relied upon, in order that the public
could judge for itself the integrity and reliability of the information
which the newspaper had presumed to publish!
The reporter refused to provide the names of his confidential
informants, claiming that to do so would necessarily undermine his own
credibility with all other prospective sources of information."3 The
court held that under these circumstances, where the reporter alone
was in possession of the information without which plaintiff would be
unable to prove one way or the other the ultimate reliability of such
sources, but where the reporter refused to disclose his sources, plaintiff's allegation that such sources were not reasonably reliable would
be taken as true. Accordingly, the court submitted the case to the jury
with instructions that the jury should find in favor of the plaintiff such
damages as reasonably reflected the extent of psychic and reputational
damage as in fact the plaintiff had sustained from publication of false
the overwhelming majority of the citizens of this country are interested in [educational
systems] and in questions which affect the education and proper training of our youth.
. .. Without further discussion, we hold that this publication was a communication
between interested persons within the meaning of the statute." Id. at 350, 121 P.2d
at 766-67. The Chronicle's argument of privilege based on the mutual interest of
the readers and the newspaper would be strengthened by the paper's earlier successful
claim that it was a responsible agent for the public and hence should be privileged
in its communications with the public. It should be noted, however, that the court
could refuse to follow the interpretation of section 47(3) given by the court in Harris
because the plaintiff in that case would have been a "public official" under the standard announced in New York Times. Because the statute provided the defendant the
same protection it would have received under present constitutional interpretation, Harris would be inapplicable to a newspaper communication allegedly libeling a "private"
as opposed to a "public" plaintiff.
13. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The California evidence
laws would prevent the court from holding the reporter in contempt for refusing to
obey the subpoena. That section would not, however, immunize the newspaper from
liability. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1976).
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statements carelessly repeated by the San Francisco Chronicle. The
jury returned a judgment for $50,000.
Within a month of these two legal actions, a bill was introduced
in Congress to bring all newspapers with a general circulation in excess
of 20,000 daily copies within the scope of the Federal Communications
Act. The bill required each qualifying paper to be licensed according
to the standard already applicable to all radio and television
broadcasters, and subjected those newspapers to the same "fairness,"
"right to reply," "equal (candidates') time," and "diversity" requirements applicable to all other licensees. The basis of the proposed bill
was that, insofar as the print press had placed itself in a "preferred
position" under the first amendment, with special access rights and
special "public agency" rights which no one else was entitled to share,
in a manner fully equivalent to radio and television licensees, the newspapers should be subject to special ficuciary obligations inapplicable to
persons not as favored as the press.
The fable of cases is only that-just a fable. It remains but a
fable partly because the newspaper lost, rather than won, the San
Quentin case. The Supreme Court declined to accept the newspapers'
argument that they have more first amendment rights than others, and
above quoted statements from the Court in the Chronicle's suit for access
appear in the dissenting opinions rather than in the majority opinions in
that case. 14 The fourth estate almost surely regarded those cases as a setback. I have attempted to suggest another view of the matter. The temptation of the press toward special pleading under the first amendment is
very strong. 15 Its "success" may well call back the victory of King
14.

Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974)

(Douglas, Brennan

& Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 837 (1974) (Douglas,
Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
15. Such a caution to the press does not mean that it therefore has no basis
for seeking to protect the anonymity of sources or for seeking access to newsworthy
sources. KQED v. Houchins, No. 75-3643 (9th Cir., Nov. 1, 1976). As previously
noted, first amendment resistance to compelled disclosure has a substantial basis, whether

claimed by working journalists, lone pamphleteers, members of disfavored political parties, or others. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S.
539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S.

60 (1960).

In brief, one may readily disagree with the outcome even of Branzburg,

where the reporter's claim of privilege to refuse to appear in response to a grand

jury subpoena was rejected, simply on the basis of general first amendment theory.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Similarly, the court has held that access
claims also have a sound first amendment basis. See Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965). It may be entirely reasonable to object that the blanket restriction sustained in Saxbe was indefensibly excessive. Yet there is a pleasing irony even
in some of these cases. -Within twenty-four hours of turning away the special claims
of the press in the Saxbe case, the very same Supreme Court unanimously held that
the press was wholly immune to the access claims of others. See Miami Herald Pub-
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Pyrrhus of Epirus over the Romans at Asculum, in 279 B.C.: "One more
such victory . . . and we are lost."

Much ink has been spilled in criticism of the press. It seems clear
to me, however, that the critics will be handed a weapon forged by
the press itself every time it seeks to extend press entitlements .as the

surrogate of the public right to know. Rather, let the free press draw
strength from the specific and equal mention it receives in the first
amendment ("equal" to the same mention made of free speech) to

insure that it shares fully in the equal protection of that freedom of
expression granted to each person who holds it, and who asserts it as

his own right without pretense that he is the designated guardian of
the people's right to know.16
lishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In the choice between claiming special
privilege as an agency of the public right to know and claiming a freedom to print
or not to print what it pleases with no special duties of accountability to "the public"
(if, indeed, that is to be the choice), I think the choice for journalists is an easy
one. The free press continues to do reasonably well. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971).
16. In response to the rhetorical question whether the "free press" clause to the
first amendment is thus merely a "redundancy," I think that the most practical answer
is to compare the fate of the Red Lion Broadcasting Company with that of the Miami
Herald Publishing Company. But for the press clause, enabling the press to receive
the same protection as the lone pamphleteer or the lone haranguer, the Miami Herald
might well have suffered the same smothering fate that applies to each and to every
radio or television licensee, no matter how competitive the market in which it operates,
no matter how trivial its own market share or communicative influence, and no matter
how diverse, independent, and numerous all other sources of news, philosophy, opinions,
facts, and communicated junk within the same community.
The innovation of movable type and the communications revolution following Guttenberg's press in 1428 brought massive and unequal regulation of the printing press
in England, styled on arguments at least as impressive at the time as anything one
witnesses with respect to the cool medium. First, the audience of mass printed material
beggared the comparatively minute influence of oral speech, making the press vastly
more influential and the appropriate subject of special control not applicable to oral
speech.
Second, the physical advantage of printing press reproduction and dissemination
of copies was reinforced (even as it is today) by the impersonalism of the medium.
This impersonalism led the ordinary reader to place greater credibility in what he
"read" vis-a-vis what he merely "heard" (likewise indicating the propriety of special
rules, e.g., libel per se but not slander per se; seditious libel, but not seditious slander).
Finally, the impenetrable anonymity of printed matter, as contrasted with the listener's immediate confrontation with the person of the speaker, provided an advantage
to the press. Readers could not as readily discount the unreliability of a report of
a personal, firsthand appraisal of the story teller.
Given the FCC fate of radio and television, it is doubtless a fortunate accident
of history that the press had already become sufficiently well known by 1791 to enable
the drafters of the first amendment to anticipate Red Lion-style distinctions, and so
to draft against them, leaving nothing to doubt. One might like to think that they
would have done likewise with respect to electronic means of communication, granting
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It may be more accurate, after all, to suggest that freedom of the
press in the United States is not so much evidenced by the scrupulous
and responsible columns of the New York Times or the Washington
Post, but by the scandalous profitmongering of the sensational pulp
press and by the yellow journalism of editors who calculate their facts
and their style with a design to deceive. That they often go bankrupt
means only that even H.L. Mencken was not infallible when he said
that nobody ever went broke underestimating the taste of the American
public. That they sometimes prosper may mean only that neither was
Mencken wholly mistaken. That they are not constrained by standards
not applicable to the lone pamphleteer or to the lone haranguer, however, is itself some of the best evidence that the first amendment
is alive and well. To trade away that protection for some few bits
of privilege, purchased at the price of fastening fiduciary burdens upon
every newspaper in the country, is to strike a bargain as good as that
made by the Indians for the sale of Manhattan Island.

it equal first amendment protection as well, subject merely to equal restraints (of anti-

trust, state action theory, etc.) as other business combination modes of speech organization. In comparable areas, the Supreme Court has not arrested the application of
Bill of Rights standards by such mechanically-styled distinctions as it did in Red Lion.

See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

Despite the easy unanimity

of the Red Lion decision, there is, of course, another view. Justice Douglas was of
the opinion that no distinction should exist between newspapers and the electronic

media. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).

